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Abstract—This paper investigates the feasibility of using a
discriminate pricing scheme to offset the inconvenience that is
experienced by an energy user (EU) in trading its energy with
an energy controller in smart grid. The main objective is to
encourage EUs with small distributed energy resources (DERs),
or with high sensitivity to their inconvenience, to take part in
the energy trading via providing incentive to them with relatively
higher payment at the same time as reducing the total cost to
the energy controller. The proposed scheme is modeled through
a two-stage Stackelberg game that describes the energy trading
between a shared facility authority (SFA) and EUs in a smart
community. A suitable cost function is proposed for the SFA
to leverage the generation of discriminate pricing according to
the inconvenience experienced by each EU. It is shown that
the game has a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium (SPE),
under the certain condition at which the SFA’s total cost is
minimized, and that each EU receives its best utility according
to its associated inconvenience for the given price. A backward
induction technique is used to derive a closed form expression
for the price function at SPE, and thus the dependency of price
on an EU’s different decision parameters is explained for the
studied system. Numerical examples are provided to show the
beneficial properties of the proposed scheme.
Index Terms—Smart grid, discriminate pricing, distributed
energy resources, game theory, energy management.
I. INTRODUCTION
Energy management (or demand management) is a tech-
nique that changes the electricity usage patterns of end users in
response to the changes in the price of electricity over time [1],
[2]. With the advancement of distributed energy resources
(DERs), the technique can also be used to assist the grid or
other energy controllers such as a shared facility authority
(SFA) [3] to operate reliably and proficiently by supplying
energy to them [4].
The majority of energy management literature focuses
mainly on three different pricing schemes: time-of-use pricing;
day-ahead pricing; and real-time pricing [5]. Time-of-use
pricing [6] has three different pricing rates: peak, off-peak
and shoulder rate based on the use of electricity at different
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times of the day. Day-ahead pricing [7] is, in principle,
determined by matching offers from generators to bids from
energy users (EUs) so as to develop a classic supply and
demand equilibrium price at an hourly interval. Finally, real-
time pricing [5] refers to tariffed retail charges for delivering
electric power and energy that vary hour-to-hour, and are
determined from wholesale market prices using an approved
methodology. Other popular dynamic pricing schemes include
critical peak pricing, extreme day pricing, and extreme day
critical peak pricing [5]. It is important to note that in all of
the above mentioned pricing schemes all EUs are charged at
the same rate at any particular time.
Due to government subsidies to encourage the use of
renewables [8], more EUs with DERs are expected to be
available in smart grid. This will lead to a better completion
of a purchasing target for an energy controller, and thus more
saving from its buying cost. Particularly, for energy controllers
such as an SFA that relies on the main grid as its primary
source of energy [3], the opportunity for trading energy with
EUs can greatly reduce their dependency, and consequently
decrease their cost of energy purchase [9]. Nevertheless, not
all EUs would be interested in trading energy with the energy
controller if the benefit is not attractive [10]. This can precisely
happen to EUs with merely limited energy capacity, or to
EUs that are highly sensitive to the inconvenience caused by
the trading of energy whose expected return could be very
small. In this case, the EUs would store the energy or change
its consumption schedule rather than selling it to the energy
controller [11]. However, one possible way to address this is to
pay them a relatively higher price per unit of energy, compared
to the EUs with very large DERs, without affecting their
revenue significantly. In fact, allowing discriminate pricing not
only considerably benefits EUs with lower energy capacity
without significantly affecting others, as we will see shortly,
but also benefits the SFA by reducing its total cost of energy
purchase when adopting this flexible pricing.
For instance, consider the numerical example given in Table
I where the SFA buys its required 40 kWh energy from EU1
and EU2. EU1 has 50 kWh and EU2 has 10 kWh of energy
to sell to the SFA. In case 1, the SFA pays the same price
20 cents/kWh to each of them, and EU1 and EU2 sell 35 and
5 kWh respectively to the SFA. Hence, the revenues of EU1
TABLE I: Numerical example of a discriminate pricing scheme where an SFA
requires 40 kWh of energy from two EUs and the SFA’s total price per unit
of energy to pay to the EUs is 40 cents/kWh.
Case 1 Case 2
Payment to EU1 (cents/kWh) 20 18
Payment to EU2 (cents/kWh) 20 22
Energy supplied by EU1 (kWh) 35 32
Energy supplied by EU2 (kWh) 5 8
Revenue of EU 1 (cents) 700 576 (-17%)
Revenue of EU 2 (cents) 100 176 (+76%)
Cost to the SFA (cents) 800 752 (-6%)
and EU2 are 700 and 100 cents respectively, and the total cost
to the SFA is 800 cents. In case 2, the SFA uses discriminate
pricing to motivate EU2 to sell more to the SFA. Therefore,
it pays 22 cents/kWh to the EU2 and 18 cents/kWh to EU1.
Now, due to this increment of price EU2 increases its selling
amount to 8 kWh, and the SFA procures the remaining 32 kWh
from EU1. Therefore, the revenues changes to 576 and 176
cents for EU1 and EU2 respectively, and total cost to the SFA
reduces to 752 cents. Thus, from this particular example it
can be argued that discriminate pricing can be considerably
beneficial to EUs with small energy (revenue increment is
76%) in expense of relatively lower revenue degradation (e.g.,
17% in the case of EU1) from EUs with larger DERs. It also
reduces the cost to the SFA by 6%. Therefore, discriminate
pricing is advantageous for reducing SFA’s cost and also for
circumstances where the SFA motivates the participation of
EUs with both large and small DERs in the energy trading.
Hence, there is a need for investigation as to how this pricing
scheme can be adopted in a smart grid environment.
To this end, we take the first step towards discussing the
properties of a discriminate pricing scheme. The idea of
discriminate pricing was first used to design a consumer-
centric energy management scheme in [4]. However, no insight
was provided into the choice of different prices that are paid
to different EUs. In this paper, we first propose a scheme by
using a two-stage Stackelberg game. In the proposed scheme,
the EUs with smaller energy generation can expect higher
unit selling price, and the price is adaptive to their available
energy for sale and their sensitivity to the inconvenience of
energy exchange. At the same time, the scheme is designed
to minimize the total purchasing cost to the energy controller
whereas each EU also receives its best utility based on its
available energy, its sensitivity to the inconvenience, and the
offered price by the SFA. We prove the existence of a solution
to the proposed game, and use a backward induction method
to determine how the unit price set by the energy controller
is affected by an EU’s various parameters. We further de-
rive a closed form expression for differing price generation
considering some conditions on the energy controller’s cost
function. Finally, we present some numerical cases to show
the properties of the proposed discriminate pricing scheme.
We stress that current grid systems do not allow such
discriminate pricing among EUs. However, we envision it as
a further addition to real-time pricing schemes in future smart
grid. Examples of such differentiation can also be found in
standard Feed-in-Tariff (FIT) schemes [12].
II. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a smart community consisting of a large number
of EUs, an SFA and the main electric grid. Each EU can be a
single user, or group of users connected via an aggregator that
acts as a single entity [13]. EUs are equipped with distributed
energy resources (DERs) such as wind turbines and solar
arrays. They can sell their energy, if there is any remaining
after meeting their essential loads, to the SFA or to the main
grid to make some extra revenue. Since the grid’s buying price
is significantly low in general [14], it is reasonable to assume
that each EU would be more interested in selling its energy to
the SFA instead of selling to the grid. Alternatively, an EU can
store its energy or schedule its equipment instead of selling
the energy to the SFA if the return benefit is not attractive,
i.e., if the price is not convenient enough for the EU to trade
its energy. We briefly explain this phenomenon by an example
in Fig. 1.
In Fig. 1, we use the same example of Table I and show
how sensitive an EU is to the inconvenience of trading energy
caused by the change of price per unit of energy. As can be
seen from the figure, EU1 has considerably lower essential
load than EU2, and thus has a larger available energy to
supply to the SFA. As a result, in case 1, EU1 supplies 35
kWh of energy to the SFA whereas EU2 supplies 5 kWh
for the same per unit price of 20 cents/kWh after using the
energy for their other flexible loads. However, in case 2, the
SFA adopts a discriminate pricing scheme and changes the
per unit price to 18 cents/kWh and 22 cents/kWh to pay
to EU1 and EU2 respectively. Due to the change of price,
the expected return for EU2 becomes larger from trading its
energy at the expense of the revenue degradation from EU1.
Consequently, energy trading becomes more inconvenient for
EU1 where as at the same time it becomes more appealing
for EU2. As shown in Fig. 1, due to their sensitivities to the
inconvenience caused by the change of price, EU1 reduces its
amount of energy for selling to 32 kWh (i.e., by increasing
its use of the remaining available energy for other purposes
such as storage) whereas EU2 increases its amount of energy
for selling to 8 kWh in case 2. In this paper, we quantify this
Fig. 1: Example of how EUs are sensitive to the inconvenience caused by a
change of price, which thus affects their amount of energy to trade with the
SFA.
sensitivity of each EU to the relative inconvenience through an
inconvenience parameter1, as we will see shortly, and analyze
its effects on the total cost to the SFA. The SFA refers to an
energy controller2 that controls the electricity consumed by
the equipment and machines that are shared and used by EUs
on daily basis. The SFA does not have any energy generation
capacity, and therefore depends on EUs and the main grid for
its required energy. The SFA is connected to the main grid
and all EUs via power and communication lines [13].
To this end, let us assume that N EUs in a set N are
taking part in energy trading with the SFA. At a particular
time of the day, the SFA’s energy requirement is Er, and each
EU i ∈ N has an available energy of Ei after meeting its
essential load from which it can sell ei to the SFA. The main
objective of each EU i is to make some extra revenue by
selling ei to the SFA at a price ci per unit of energy. However,
the choice of ei is reasonably affected by the inconvenience
parameter αi, which is a measure of sensitivity of EU i to
the inconvenience it faces to trade its energy. In this regard,
we define a utility function Ui for each EU i that captures
the effect of this inconvenience, and is assumed to possess the
following properties:
i) The utility function is an increasing function of ei and ci,
and a decreasing function of inconvenience parameter αi.
That is δUi
δei
, δUi
δci
> 0, and δUi
δαi
< 0. αi captures the fact
that the utility will decrease for an EU if its sensitivity to
the inconvenience of trading energy increases.
ii) The utility function is a concave function of ei, i.e.,
δ2Ui
δei2
< 0. Therefore, the utility can become saturated
or even decrease with an excessive ei. This can be
interpreted by the fact that since EUs with DERs are
equipped with a battery with limited capacity in general,
excessive supply of energy once exceeding a certain limit
would risk the depletion of battery due to the aging effect
upon the battery, and consequently decrease the EU’s
utility.
Formally, we define Ui ∀i as
Ui = eici + (Ei − αiei)ei. (1)
In (1), eici is the direct income that the EU i receives
from selling its energy to the SFA at a price ci per unit of
energy. (Ei − αiei)ei refers to the possible loss for the EU’s
inconvenience sensitivity αi > 0. Different values of αi reflect
different negative impacts of energy supply on an EU’s utility,
and an EU can set higher αi if it prefers to sell less. For
example, the effects of ci and αi on an EU’s utility from
its energy trading is shown in Fig. 2. Now, with the goal of
maximizing utility, the objective of each EU can be expressed
as
max
ei
[eici + (Ei − αiei)ei] . (2)
1Where a higher and lower value of this parameter refers to the higher and
lower sensitivity of an EU respectively to the inconvenience caused by energy
trading.
2For the rest of this paper, we will use SFA to indicate an energy controller
as discussed in Section I.
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Fig. 2: Effect of parameters such as αi and ci on the achieved utility of an
EU are shown in this figure. As can be seen in the figure, for the same αi a
higher ci encourages an EU to sell more to the SFA and thus the maximum
utility shifts towards a higher value on the right. By contrast, a higher αi
causes more inconvenience to the EU which can lead the utility even to a
negative value (i.e., cost) for greater energy trading.
However, as a buyer of energy, the SFA wants to minimize
its total cost J of energy purchase from EUs and the grid. In
this paper, we consider the following cost function to capture
the total cost to the SFC for buying its required energy from
EUs and the grid:
J =
N∑
i=1
(
eic
k
i + aici + bi
)
+ cg
(
Er −
∑
i
ei
)
, (3)
such that ∑
i
ci ≤ C, cmin ≤ ci ≤ cmax, (4)
where C is the total unit energy price [4], and cmin and cmax
are the lower and upper limits of unit price that the SFA can
pay to any EU [4]. In (3), eicki corresponds to the direct cost
eici that is weighted by ck−1i to generate discriminate prices
for EUs with different αi, and the term (aici+ bi), ai, bi > 0
accounts for other costs such as transmission cost and store
of purchased energy cost [4]. cg (Er −
∑
i ei) is the cost of
purchasing energy from the grid. C scales a set of normalized
prices to generate the unit price ci. It is fixed for a particular
time and can be determined by the SFA using any real-time
price estimator, e.g., the estimator proposed in [15].
Now, the SFA’s objective is to set a price ci per unit of
energy for each EU i that not only minimizes its total cost
in (3) but also pays a price to each EU according to their
inconvenience parameters, and thus encourages them to take
part in energy trading with the SFA. Therefore, the objective
of the SFA can be defined as
min
ci
[
N∑
i=1
(
eic
k
i + aici + bi
)
+ cg
(
Er −
∑
i
ei
)]
, (5)
such that (4) is satisfied.
We stress that (2) and (5) are related via ei and ci, and can
be solved in a centralized fashion. However, considering that
the nodes in the system are distributed, it is more advanta-
geous to define a solution approach that can be implemented
distributedly according to the parameter setting within the
system [16]. In this regard, we propose to use a game theoretic
formulation. In [4], the effect of changing C on the cost
to a seller was investigated, and a distributed algorithm was
proposed to design a consumer-centric smart grid via capturing
this effect. In this paper, we focus on exploring the influence
of different EUs’ behavior on the choice of price by the SFA,
and the resultant cost incurred to it. To that end, we propose
a two-stage Stackelberg game in the next section.
III. TWO-STAGE STACKELBERG GAME
To determine energy trading parameters ei and ci, on the
one hand, each EU i needs to decide on the amount of
energy ei that it wants to sell to the SFA according to its
inconvenience sensitivity and the offered price. On the other
hand, based on the amount of energy offered by each EU
and its inconvenience parameter, the SFA agrees on the price
vector c = [c1, c2, . . . , cN ] that it wants to pay to each EU
such that the cost J to the SFA is minimized. Thereupon,
this sequential interaction can be modeled as a two-stage
Stackelberg game [17], which is formally defined as
Ω = {(N ∪ {SFA}), {Ei}i∈N , {Ui}i∈N , J, c}. (6)
In (6), (N ∪ {SFA}) is the set of total players in the game
where each EU i ∈ N is a follower, and {SFA} is the leader.
Ei is the strategy vector of each follower i and Ui is the
utility that the follower i receives from choosing its strategy
ei ∈ Ei. J is the cost incurred to the SFA for choosing the
strategy vector c.
As the leader of Ω, the SFA chooses its strategy vector c
in the first stage of the game such that its cost function in
(3) is minimized, and the constraints in (4) are satisfied. In
the second stage of the game, each EU i ∈ N independently
chooses ei in order to maximize its utility in (1) in response to
ci chosen by the SFA. Consequently, Ω reaches the equilibrium
solution of the game.
A. Solution Concept
A general solution of a multi-stage Stackelberg game
such as the proposed Ω is the sub-game perfect equilibrium
(SPE) [17]. A common method to determine the SPE of a
Stackelberg game is to adopt a backward induction technique
that captures the sequential dependencies of decisions between
stages of the game [17]. To that end, we first analyze how each
EU would maximize its benefit by playing its best response to
the price offered by the SFA in stage two. Then, we explore
how the SFA decides on different prices to pay to different EUs
according to their offered energy and inconveniences. We note
that, due to the method for game formulation, Ω will possess
a SPE if there exists a solution in both stages of the decision
making process by the SFA and EUs. In fact, the existence
of a solution in pure strategies is not always guaranteed in
a game [18], and hence there is a need to investigate the
existence of a solution in the proposed Ω.
Theorem 1. A unique SPE exists for the proposed two-stage
Stackelberg game Ω if k = 2 in (3).
Proof: According to the backward induction technique,
each EU i ∈ N decides on their energy trading parameters
ei ∀i at the second stage of the game to maximize (2). It is a
strictly concave function of ei as δ
2Ui
δc2
i
= −2αi and αi > 0.
Hence, EU’s decision making problem has a unique solution.
Furthermore, in the first stage of the game, the SFA optimizes
its price ci to pay to each EU i. Now, we note that if k = 2
in (3), which is a general choice of quadratic cost function for
electricity utility companies and controllers [4], [16], the cost
function (3) is strictly convex with respect to ci. Thus, for the
amount of energy offered by each EU, the choice of different
price to pay to each i also possesses a unique solution, which
minimizes (5). Hence, the game Ω possesses a unique SPE,
and thus Theorem 1 is proved.
B. Analysis of Energy Trading Behavior
In this section, we show how the energy trading behavior
of the SFA and EUs are affected by different decision making
parameters such as the price set by the SFA, and the inconve-
nience that is caused to each EU for trading its energy. First,
we consider the second stage of the game where each EU i
plays its best response to the price ci offered by the SFA.
Since the utility function in (1) is differentiable, we obtain the
first order derivative δUi
δei
, and Ui attains its maximum when
δUi
δei
= 0. Therefore, from (1), the best response function of
EU i to a given ci can be expressed as
e∗i (ci) =
ci + Ei
2αi
, (7)
which leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1. For an offered price ci, the amount of energy
ei that an EU i is willing to sell, from its available energy
Ei, to the SFA decreases with the increase of its sensitivity to
inconvenience αi. In other words, an EU with inconvenience
parameter αi would be more willing to sell its energy to the
SFA for a higher price per unit of energy.
The SFA’s cost, on the other hand, is determined by the
price c∗i that it wants to pay to each EU i for its offered
energy e∗i . Therefore, in the first stage of the game the SFA
determines the price c∗i ∀i having the knowledge of the energy
vector e = [e∗1, e
∗
2, . . . , e
∗
N ] offered by all EUs via (7). Now,
the Lagrangian for the SFA’s optimization problem in (5) is
given by
Γ =
∑
i
(
e∗i c
k
i + aici + bi
)
+ cg(Er −
∑
i
e∗i )
+ λ(C −
∑
i
ci), (8)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier and
δΓ
δci
= 0. (9)
In (8), we only consider the case when cmin ≤ ci ≤ cmax,
i.e., the Lagrange multiplier associated with cmin and cmax are
assumed to be zero3. Now replacing the value e∗i in (8) from
(7), (9) can be expressed as
k + 1
2αi
cki +
kEi
2αi
ck−1i + ai −
cg
cn
− λ = 0. (10)
Now, for the general case4 k = 2,
3c2i + 2Eici + 2αi(ai − λ)− cg = 0, (11)
and consequently,
ci =
−Ei +
[
E2i − 3 (2αi(ai − λ) − cg)
] 1
2
3
. (12)
In (12), λ and ai ∀i are design parameters, and thus constant
for a particular system. λ needs to be chosen significantly
higher than ai ∀i such that ci always possesses a positive
value. Note that we skip the other solution of ci in (12) for
the same reason.
From (12), we note that for the same generation and grid
price, a higher price needs to be paid to an EU i with higher
inconvenience parameter αi compared to an EU j, j 6= i with
αj < αi to encourage it to sell energy. Nevertheless, in cases
when ci > cmax and ci < cmin, the SFA sets ci to the respective
limits. Hence, the choice of price by the SFA to pay to each
EU i at the SPE can be expressed as
c∗i =


cmin, ci < cmin
−Ei+[E2i−3(2αi(ai−λ)−cg)]
1
2
3 , cmin ≤ ci ≤ cmax
cmax, ci > cmax
. (13)
IV. CASE STUDY
To show the properties of the proposed discriminate pricing
scheme, we consider an example in which a number of EUs
are interested in trading their energy with the SFA in the time
slot of interest. We assume that the available energy to each
EU, after meeting its essential load, is uniformly distributed
within [50, 250], and the energy required by the SFA for the
considered time slot is 650 kWh. The value of λ is chosen to
be 1000. The grid’s selling price is set to be 50 cents/kWh,
and cmax and cmin are assumed to be 38 and 10 cents/kWh5
respectively. These two values are chosen such that the SFA
can pay to each EU a price, which is lower than the grid’s
selling price, and at the same time is higher than the grid’s
buying price. This condition is necessary to motivate all EUs
to trade their energy only with the SFA instead of the grid.
Nonetheless, we highlight that all parameter values are chosen
3The conditions for c∗
i
= cmin and c∗i = cmax are considered at the solution
of the ci in (13).
4We will consider k = 2 for the rest of the paper.
5Price cmin is marginally greater than the price of 8.45 cents/kWh that a
grid typically pays to buy energy from DERs [12].
particularly for this case study only and that these values may
vary between different case studies.
In Fig. 3, we show how the price per unit of energy is
decided by the SFA for each EU. According to (13), for a
particular grid price cg , the unit price ci that the SFA pays to
each EU i depends on 1) EU’s inconvenience parameter αi,
and 2) the available energy Ei to each EU. First, we consider
five EUs with the same Ei = 150 kWh, but with different
inconvenience in selling their energy to the SFA. We note that
the SFA tends to pay more, within the constraint in (4), to the
EU with higher sensitivity to inconvenience. In fact, a higher
inconvenience parameter refers to the state at which trading
energy with the SFA is not a convenient option for an EU.
Therefore, to encourage the EU to sell the energy the SFA
needs to increase its unit price to pay. However, if ci becomes
more than cmax, the SFA pays cmax to the EU as shown in the
case of the last EU with inconvenience parameter αi = 3 in
Fig. 3.
By contrast, for the same sensitivity to inconvenience, the
SFA pays a higher price to an EU with lower available energy
and vice versa. In fact, a lower available energy could stop
an EU from selling the energy to the SFA as it might not
bring significant benefit to the EU at a lower price. Hence,
to provide more incentive to the EU, the SFA needs to pay a
relatively higher price per unit of energy. However, EUs with
larger amount of energy can still obtain higher utilities from
trading a considerable amount of energy with the SFA even at
a relatively lower price, as explained by the example in Table
I. Thus, the SFA pays comparatively a lower price to such EUs
to minimize the cost of energy trading, such that the energy
trading does not effect their utilities significantly6.
6We note that the lowest price per unit of energy cmin is assumed to be
higher than the buying price of the grid. Therefore, any EU with a higher
available energy would benefit more from trading with the SFA instead of
trading with the grid.
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Fig. 4: Effect of behavior of EUs on the total amount of energy that the SFA
buys from each class of EUs.
After showing how prices are set by the SFA to pay to
different EUs, we now show the effect of different behavior
of EUs in a group on the total cost to the SFA. First we
note that EUs’ behaviors are dominated by their inconvenience
parameters α. For example, if an EU with very large available
energy does not want to sell its energy at the offered price it
can set its α high and thus insignificantly (or, not at all) take
part in energy trading. Hence, we can model different EUs
behaviors by simply changing their αi ∀i. To this end, we
assume a network with 10 EUs that have the same available
energy 150 kWh but different inconvenience parameters to sell
their energy to the SFA. For this particular case, we consider
total unit energy price C = 380 cents/kWh so that even
when all EUs are paid at cmax, the constraints in (4) are still
satisfied, and the unit price for each EU remains lower than
the grid’s selling price. We compare the performance with an
equal distribution scheme (EDS) such as in [19], where C is
equally divided to pay to each EU for buying its energy. That
is in EDS each EU is paid a price7 C
N
per unit of energy,
where N is the total EUs in the network.
TABLE II: Different behavioral cases of EUs in the network (a total of 10
EUs) – where the number of EUs with a particular inconvenience parameter
αi ∈ {1, 2, 3} is specified.
Cases αi = 1 αi = 2 αi = 3
1 6 EUs 2 EUs 2 EUs
2 4 EUs 3 EUs 3 EUs
3 2 EUs 4 EUs 4 EUs
4 2 EUs 2 EUs 6 EUs
5 1 EU 1 EU 8 EUs
6 0 0 10 EUs
To that end, we categorize the behavior of EUs into six
different cases based on the number of EUs with particular
inconvenience parameters αi in the group as shown in Ta-
7For N = 10, each EU is paid a price 38 cents/kWh.
ble II. Although we have chosen only three integer values of
αi ∈ {1, 2, 3}, other fractional values within this range are
equally applicable to define different levels of sensitivity to
inconvenience. Now first we see from Fig. 4 that as the number
of EUs with αi = 1 dominates the group, the SFA buys most
of its energy from them. For example, in case 1 and case
2, the number of EUs with αi = 1 is higher in the system
and consequently, the SFA buys significantly large amount of
energy from them in these two cases compared to the other
cases, as shown in Fig 4. However, as their number reduces
the SFA needs to buy more energy from the other two types of
EUs, based on their percentage of presence in the group, with
relatively higher payment. In the extreme case, i.e., case 6,
the SFA needs to buy all its energy from EUs with αi = 3 as
there are no other types of EUs in the system. Consequently,
this trend of energy trading affects the total cost to the SFA
from buying its energy from EUs and the grid. We show these
effects separately in Table III.
From Table III, first we note that the amount of energy
that the SFA buys from the grid increases as the categories of
EUs change from case 1 to case 6 in the system. This is due
to the fact that as the number of EUs with higher sensitivity
to inconvenience increases in the group, the total amount of
power that the SFA can trade with EUs becomes lower. Hence,
the SFA needs to procure the remainder of required energy
from the grid at a higher price. Secondly, the cost to the SFA
to buy energy from EUs with higher inconvenience parameters
also increases its cost significantly as the SFA needs to pay a
higher price to them. For example, consider the different cost
that is incurred to the SFA for buying energy from different
types of EUs in case 1. From Fig 4, we can see that the amount
of energy that the SFA buys from EUs with αi = 1 is almost
five times the amount it buys from EUs with αi = 2 and 3.
However, the resultant cost is only three times more than the
cost to buy from EUs with higher sensitivity. Therefore, more
EUs with lower sensitivity to inconvenience allows the SFA to
procure more energy at a comparatively lower cost. Therefore,
the total cost incurred by the SFA increases significantly with
an increase in the number of EUs with higher inconvenience
parameters as can be seen from Table III.
We also compare the total cost that is incurred to the SFA
with the case when the SFA adopts an EDS scheme for
energy trading in Table III. In an EDS scheme, the cost to
the SFA remains the same for all type of EU groups as the
cost does not depend on their categories. From Table III, the
proposed scheme shows considerable benefit for the SFA in
terms of reduction in total cost when there are a relatively
higher number of EUs with lower inconvenience parameters
in the group. For example, as shown in Table III, the cost
reduction for the SFA is 49.9% and 36.63% respectively
for case 1 and 2. According to the current case study, the
average total cost reduction for the SFA is 23.18% compared
to the EDS. However, the cost increases with the increase
of number of EUs with high inconvenience parameters, and
becomes the same as the EDS scheme when all the EUs in the
group become highly sensitive to the inconvenience of energy
TABLE III: Cost to the SFA in dollars for different EUs’ behaviors (cases stated in Table II).
Different Costs Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
Cost for buying from EUs with αi = 1 68.92 45.94 22.97 22.97 11.48 0
Cost for buying from EUs with αi = 2 23.6 35.4 47.2 23.6 11.8 0
Cost for buying from EUs with αi = 3 24.36 38.4 48.72 73.08 97.44 121.8
Cost for buying from the grid 53.91 98.16 142.42 155.18 186.88 218.58
Total cost for proposed scheme 170.79 216.06 261.32 274.89 307.62 341
Total cost for EDS 341 341 341 341 341 341
% reduction in total cost 49.91% 36.63% 23.36% 19.38% 9.78% 0%
trading, i.e., αi = 3, ∀i as can be seen from Table III.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a discriminate pricing scheme has been studied
to counterbalance the inconvenience experienced by energy
users (EUs) with distributed energy resources (DERs) in trad-
ing their energy with other entities in smart grids. A suitable
cost function has been designed for a shared facility authority
(SFA) that can effectively generate different prices per unit
of energy to pay to each participating EU according to an
inconvenience parameter for the EU. A two-stage Stackelberg
game, which has been shown to have a unique sub-game
perfect equilibrium, has been proposed to capture the energy
trading between the SFA and different EUs. The properties
of the scheme have been studied at the equilibrium by using
a backward induction technique. A theoretical price function
has been derived for the SFA to decide on the price that it
wants to pay to each EU, and the properties of the scheme
are explained via numerical case studies. By comparing with
an equal distribution scheme (EDS), it has been shown that
discriminate pricing gives considerable benefit to the SFA
in terms of reduction in total cost. One interesting future
extension of the proposed scheme would be to design an
algorithm that can capture the decision making process of
the SFA and EUs in a distributed fashion. Also, finding a
mathematical theorem that would explain the benefits to the
SFA due to the discriminate pricing scheme is another possible
extension of this work. Finally, the design of a scheme (i.e.,
game) with imperfect information about the inconvenience
parameters also warrants future investigation.
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